telling.
morally whether a deception is achieved with an outright lie, or by an equivocation, evasion, by being "economical with the truth", or merely by refraining from correcting a misunderstanding'. Thus, he says: 'Surely it is the intention that is all important. We may be silent, tactful or reserved, but if we intend to deceive, what we are doing is tantamount to lying' (4) . And later on, he observes: 'It is hard, but vital, to see one's own evasion, duplicity or equivocation for what it is, a lie' (5) .
Yet in general it is obviously not the intention alone that counts: we may aim to improve our bank balance -by thrift or by theft: it surely matters which. And we should not confuse the virtue ofplain speaking with the vice of breezy error. It is false, rather than frank, to say that an evasion is the same as a lie. (To be sure, someone who lies may pretend to himself he is guilty only of equivocation or evasion: that is quite another story. We need, of course, to see our behaviour for what it really is, but also not to confuse categories.) The assimilation of lying to other forms of intentional deception makes sense if one is adopting a utilitarian approach to the issue oftruth-telling. Otherwise not, as I hope to show.
It should also be noted that if you share with Roger Higgs the view that doctors and nurses do not enjoy a general dispensation from the duty everyone else is under not to lie and if you also share his view that intentional deception is tantamount to lying, you must take a pretty dim view of the reputability of medical practice past and present. Has not benevolent deception always been part and parcel of accepted medical practice -'he who cannot dissimulate cannot cure' (6) ?
If doctors did think they had a special duty not to deceive intentionally we should expect it to get a mention in their codes and declarations. But it does not: not until 1980 (7) Whereas all liers intend to deceive not all who intentionally deceive tell lies. One way in which the discrepancy emerges is this -intentional deception like lying, does not require that A be communicating with B. Thus, for example if I, noticing that you are eavesdropping on my private conversation with someone else, say something false in order to mislead you, I am intentionally deceiving you but I am not lying to you. Intentional deception need not, ofcourse, involve assertion of any kind.
Moreover, intentional deception, unlike lying, does not require that A believes what he imparts to B to be false. Suppose, for example, that B thinks that A is going to lie to him and suppose that A is aware of B's suspicion. A might proceed to tell B the truth in order to mislead B who will take what A says to be false. In this case A is not lying to B though plainly he is intentionally deceiving him. I am alarmed by my symptoms and suspect as I relate them to my doctor that he is going to play down their gravity to spare me anguish. My doctor, realising my suspicions, decides to take advantage of it to persuade me into adopting a healthier diet. Thus he proceeds truthfully to make light of my symptoms but he is at the same time intentionally deceiving me.
Notice that what we might call the conventional falsehoods of polite conversation, as in the exchange of greetings, are not lies by the above definition. Dennis Potter during a hospital stay overheard a nurse saying to a patient who was dying of throat cancer, 'How are you?' to which the patient managed to croak the reply 'In the pink': plainly a false assertion but hardly intended to deceive (10 In seeking an explanation of the wrongness of lying we need rather to reflect on the necessity for any community to preserve trust and the crucial role upholding a rule against lying plays here. Just how strict a rule against lying it is necessary to uphold is not so easy to establish -although in view of the importance of preserving trust as the basis of fellowship and the extreme difficulty of restoring it in a community if once it is lost, it would seem that a pretty firm teaching is called for.
At least it would seem so if we can also assume that people would lie unless they were subjected to a firm teaching to check the tendency: only if we are prone to lie in the first place do we need to arm ourselves against the tendency with an appropriate teaching. Such an assumption about human nature might be challenged. Even doctors who would defend lying as an acceptable feature of normal medical practice may agree with the rather feeble-sounding conclusion I have drawn in Part II, that everyone has at least a prima facie duty not to tell lies. They simply argue that often they are obliged to set aside this merely primafacie duty in order to fulfil their first duty as doctors -to care for their patients.
Two points deserve comment here. This defence of lying assumes (i) the patient's deception is often necessary (ii) where deception is justified, lying is justified.
(i) Is it true that doctors often have no alternative in fulfilling their caring duties -that deliberate deception is often therapeutically necessary? Perhaps doctors would want this question to be made more specific if it is to be sensibly discussed -is deception of childpatients or dying patients, or depressed patients often necessary? Be that as it may, the question does need to be made more specific in another way -in view of the inherent vagueness of the notion of necessity. A particular treatment, for example, may be said to be necessary in order to cure a patient -or to do so without enormous expense, or trouble, or distress to the patient. Thus, when it is said that lying is therapeutically necessary, we may need further clarification as to how, in what way, it is necessary.
There is, moreover, a lack of precision about a duty of care as opposed say to a duty not to commit adultery or a duty to pay one's debts. The duty of care is openended. There being virtually no end to what you can do in accordance with the duty of care it is far from clear what you must do in order to fulfil this duty. Legally, a doctor's duty of care is measured against the yardstick of normal practice. But morally?
In view of the vagueness about the notion of necessity and the imprecision about requirements imposed by a duty of care, we should not be surprised to find that doctors who agree that they have a duty not to lie and a duty of care may still disagree when presented with the same case history whether the one duty is overridden by the other.
Suppose, for example, that while doing a locum for a colleague away on holiday, you are called to attend a patient who is dying of cancer and whose relatives tell you that she does not know and must not be told: the truth, they insist, would kill her more swiftly than the disease. But what if when you meet her, she asks you point blank: 'Have I got cancer?' Could you be justified in lying?
In anticipation of finding yourself in such a situation let us suppose that you consult with some colleaguesthey do not agree in their advice: Dr Noteller agrees with the relatives. He cites cases he has encountered in which patients upon being told the truth have died with unexpected suddenness as if, indeed, the news precipitated their demise. Why risk that for patients whose diseases might otherwise allow them weeks, even months, of tolerable existence? Thus, does Dr Noteller counsel you to withhold the truth and, if necessary, lie rather than shatter the patient's hopes. Dr Teller disagrees with the relatives. He dismisses the tales ofpatients dying because allegedly 'they could not live with the truth'. This happens only where the doctors concerned botch the telling, he insists, and do not follow it up with proper counselling. It is not necessary to lie or even to deceive in such a case. On the contrary, the patient and the relatives should be told the truth so that they can be freed from the isolating trap of deception that makes dying an unnecessarily lonely experience for both parties. But the patient and the relatives need help and support to come to terms with reality. Thus does Dr Teller counsel you not to lie. Indeed he urges that the patient be told the truth.
(ii) Supposing that there is often (seen to be) a therapeutic justification for doctors deliberately deceiving their patients, it does not follow that lying to them is thereby justified. Even Many people fall in with a utilitarian approach to ethics -for them, our question as to when lying to patients is morally defensible turns on the overall harm/benefit oflying -whether it would be for the best to lie, bearing in mind all relevant interests (which would doubtless, include the interests of other people, for example, family, nursing staff). Once it is established as it surely would be, that in some cases deliberate deception is for the best, the further question of whether to accomplish it by a lie, or an equivocation, evasion or whatever becomes a mere technicality of no particular moral significance, to be decided again by applying the same procedure of weighing costs against benefits. Those who adopt this approach are understandably impatient with fine distinctions such as I have attempted -to them these are a practical irrelevance -certainly not to be inflicted on doctors addressing questions of medical ethics.
But this utilitarian approach to the ethics of lying seems to me to be radically misguided. The distinctions to which I drew attention in Part I were not proffered merely as an example of minute philosophising but as ofpractical relevance to the issues before us, for example, whether lying to patients is morally defensible.
As I argued in Part II the wrongness oflying is not to be located in the harm suffered by the person lied tonor, I now would add, by the harm suffered generally, bearing in mind, for example, its effect on observers. It is to be explained rather in terms of the need a community (any community) has to maintain a firm rule against lying -a rule the function of which is to preclude lying as a practical option, as a possible method for achieving whatever aims we happen to have. And if as a community we need the rule we cannot allow ourselves the freedom to set aside the rule whenever an occasion presents where it appears that so doing would be for the best: that would be to abandon the rule -it would lose its essential function.
Yet the very question I have posed: 'When is lying to patients morally defensible?' rather invites us to adopt a utilitarian approach -it invites us to review the plight of patients in various situations to see whether lying is never, sometimes, or often, jusified. On my account of the wrongness of lying maybe we should not allow ourselves to be drawn into a discussion of what harm there is in setting this rule aside in regard to patient A or patient B.
Now some utilitarians would actually share my misgivings about what I have been calling the utilitarian approach and which they would call, rather, an act utilitarian approach. They too, as rule utilitarians, argue that there are certain rules which a community needs to uphold and which we should be learning to follow as a matter of course in our day-today activities without stopping to calculate consequences though meanwhile, they say, in our less active more reflective moments, we should be reviewing and revising our rules in the light ofour dayto-day experience -seeking always to develop our rules so as to improve them (11) .
How does the position I am advocating in regard to lying differ from that of the rule utilitarians? Ifthe rule against lying is, as I have allowed, primafacie, it may on occasion be morally defensible for doctors to lie to their patients. Jennifer Jackson 9 are on the same footing. In their view then the one practice poses just as much of a threat to trust as does the other. Such a supposition, if it comes to be widely shared is self-fulfilling.
But I do not think that this view is widely shared. It is not shared, at any rate, outside the medical context: as I have argued, we practise deliberate deception on one another in a variety of ways that we believe pose no significant threat to trust: for example, by putting someone off the scent so as to keep a planned treat a surprise: a stratagem, it may be noted, which we play on our friends with whom we care most to preserve trust.
Perhaps, though, it can be shown that doctors have a special duty not to deceive their patients, a duty which derives from another duty universally acknowledged by doctors, viz their duty of care. While some might protest that it is this very duty of care which makes benevolent deception on occasion not just permissible but obligatory, it might be argued that on the contrary from the duty of care may be derived a duty to maintain trust (without which a patient cannot be got to follow advice) and, from that duty derives another, to refrain from deception. Thus Roger Higgs remarks: 'If truth is the first casualty, trust is the second' (12) .
This pronouncement has a certain force and simplicity about it. On examination it is not so clear, though, what is being asserted. Firstly, should we go along with the assertion that the absence of truth is a casualty? A casualty for whom? After all, truth can be withheld without recourse to deception -and without any injury to those shielded from it: there are many things that we are better off not knowing (the result of a match if we are about to watch the replay) or that we ought not to be told (a doctor has many confidences to keep). Secondly, non-deceptive withholding of truth aside, it remains unclear whether the truth which is being said to underpin trust is a matter of not telling lies (my view) or also a matter of not deliberately deceiving (the Higgs view)? In other words, the saying could be cited in support of either view; it does not tell in favour of one against the other.
I conclude that while doctors generally speaking should have no truck with lying, deliberate deception need not in general pose a significant threat to trust.
